Risk‐based strategies for surveillance of bovine Tuberculosis infection in cattle for low risk areas in England and Scotland by Salvador, Liliana C. M. et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Riskbased strategies for surveillance of bovine Tuberculosis
infection in cattle for low risk areas in England and Scotland
Citation for published version:
Salvador, LCM, Deason, M, Enright, J, Bessell, P & Kao, R 2018, 'Riskbased strategies for surveillance of
bovine Tuberculosis infection in cattle for low risk areas in England and Scotland' Epidemiology and
Infection, vol. 146, no. 1, pp. 107-118. DOI: 10.1017/S0950268817001935
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1017/S0950268817001935
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Epidemiology and  Infection
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Risk-based strategies for surveillance of tuberculosis infection in
cattle for low-risk areas in England and Scotland
L. C. M. SALVADOR1, M. DEASON1, J. ENRIGHT3, P. R. BESSELL2 AND
R. R. KAO1*
1Boyd Orr Centre for Population and Ecosystem Health, Institute of Biodiversity, Animal Health and
Comparative Medicine, College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
2The Roslin Institute, The University of Edinburgh, Easter Bush, Midlothian, UK
3Computing Science and Mathematics, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, UK
Received 22 December 2016; Final revision 9 June 2017; Accepted 3 August 2017
SUMMARY
Disease surveillance can be made more effective by either improving disease detection, providing
cost savings, or doing both. Currently, cattle herds in low-risk areas (LRAs) for bovine
tuberculosis (bTB) in England are tested once every 4 years. In Scotland, the default herd testing
frequency is also 4 years, but a risk-based system exempts some herds from testing altogether. To
extend this approach to other areas, a bespoke understanding of at-risk herds and how risk-based
surveillance can affect bTB detection is required. Here, we use a generalized linear mixed model
to inform a Bayesian probabilistic model of freedom from infection and explore risk-based
surveillance strategies in LRAs and Scotland. Our analyses show that in both areas the primary
herd-level risk factors for bTB infection are the size of the herd and purchasing cattle from high-
risk areas of Great Britain and/or Ireland. A risk-based approach can improve the current
surveillance system by both increasing detection (9% and 7% fewer latent infections), and
reducing testing burden (6% and 26% fewer animal tests) in LRAs and Scotland, respectively.
Testing at-risk herds more frequently can also improve the level of detection by identifying more
infected cases and reducing the hidden burden of the disease, and reduce surveillance effort by
exempting low-risk herds from testing.
Key words: Bovine tuberculosis, risk factors, risk-based surveillance, routine-herd-testing,
slaughterhouse.
INTRODUCTION
Bovine tuberculosis (bTB) in cattle is the most eco-
nomically important disease of livestock in Great
Britain (GB), with substantial impact on animal
health and welfare, farmers’ livelihoods and their
well-being [1–6]. A zoonosis, bTB is caused by
Mycobacterium bovis and it affects an increasing
number of cattle herds in GB, with an especially
high incidence in the South West of England and in
Wales (high-risk areas or HRAs) [4, 7]. While factors
such as herd size, being a dairy farm, and some farm-
ing practices have been identiﬁed as herd-level risks
[3, 8–13], the presence of a wildlife reservoir, the
Eurasian badger (Meles meles), makes the control of
the disease particularly difﬁcult and controversial
[2, 11, 14–16]. In contrast, wildlife reservoirs do not
appear to make a meaningful contribution to the
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spread of bTB in cattle into low-risk areas (LRAs)
such as the north and east of England, or into
Scotland [4, 17]. While large outbreaks in cattle do
occur here [18] and the risk of establishment in wildlife
must be considered, in these areas control efforts can
focus on infection in cattle, and particularly on
imports from HRAs and from Ireland (both the
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland), where
bTB prevalence is also high [3, 12, 18–20]. The preva-
lence of bTB in LRAs and in Scotland has been stable
since 2006 and it remains at low levels (∼0·1 in LRAs
and <0·01 in Scotland) [17]. While other supplemen-
tary tests are used [21, 22], bTB cases are mostly iden-
tiﬁed using the Single Intradermal Comparative
Cervical test (SICCT or colloquially, the ‘skin test’)
or by carcass inspection at the slaughterhouse. A posi-
tive reaction is deﬁned as a difference of >4 mm in
skin swelling when comparing responses with anti-
genic derivatives from Mycobacterium avium and
M. bovis, 72 h post injection. An animal with a posi-
tive test (reactor) is slaughtered and movement restric-
tions are imposed on the farm. A reactor is then
conﬁrmed by identiﬁcation of at least one tuberculous
lesion post-mortem or if M. bovis is successfully cul-
tured from tissue samples.
Traditionally, the bTB surveillance in GB regime
allowed for different frequencies of routine herd testing
(1 year RHT: HRAs, 2–3 year RHT: intermediate risk
areas, 4 year RHT: LRAs), which was based upon the
perceived risk of bTB in a given parish or the neigh-
bouring parishes. In recent years more geographically
streamlined designations have been introduced. All
herds in Wales were ofﬁcially placed on annual RHT
in 2010. In England, a new bTB surveillance regime
has been in place since 1 January 2013, whereby
most herds in counties of the so-called low-risk area
(LRA) are tested once every 4 years, whereas herds
in the HRA of the West of England and a
‘transitional’ zone of intermediate bTB incidence
known as the Edge Area (currently encompassing
Hampshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Northamp-
tonshire, Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire and parts of
East Sussex, Oxfordshire, Warwickshire, Derbyshire
and Cheshire) are tested annually (see online
Supplementary Fig. S1). In order to speed up the detec-
tion of infected herds in increasing bTB incidence parts
of the Edge Area, a 6-monthly testing regime has been
established since January 2015. Furthermore, at the
end of 2016, Defra consulted on proposals to replace
annual testing with 6 monthly herd testing in other
high bTB incidence parts of the Edge Area of
England. This change in the surveillance testing regime
may come into effect during 2017. Additional targeted
testing is also performed in herds contiguous to herds
with Ofﬁcially Tuberculosis Free Status Withdrawn
(OTFW) due to fully conﬁrmed infection (contiguous
and radial tests), in herds that have recently regained
Ofﬁcially TB Free Status after suffering an episode of
bTB (6- and 12-monthly check tests), herds with
back traced reactors or cases detected through slaugh-
ter surveillance (immediate check tests), herds in
annual testing areas that send animals to other farms
(pre-movement tests) and herds in LRAs that receive
animals from annual testing areas (post-movement
tests) or from Ireland (post-Irish imports).
In Scotland, all eligible herds were tested every 4
years under the RHT policy until 31 December of
2011; since then, a risk-based surveillance system has
been adopted exempting from RHT herds identiﬁed
as low risk and with high chance of detection via abat-
toir inspection, offering a cost reduction by requiring
fewer herd and animal tests, and fewer false positives
[23]. We hypothesise that, similar to Scotland, the cur-
rent surveillance system in LRAs could be enhanced
by a more targeted, risk-based approach that either
reduces testing of cattle (thereby saving cost and
effort), or enhances identiﬁcation of infection (thereby
reducing onward risk), or does both. Based upon this,
the objectives of this work are to (1) identify risk
factors associated with breakdowns in these areas;
(2) use a mixed logistic regression statistical model
to compute the herd probability of freedom of infec-
tion; and (3) use a risk-based surveillance model to
evaluate alternative surveillance strategies.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Underlying risk factors for bTB breakdowns
Source data
Analyses were performed using data between 2007
and 2013 from active holdings (determined by the
unique County-Parish-Holding or CPH number,
with all cattle associated with that holding assumed
here to belong to one ‘herd’) in LRAs and in
Scotland. Data on the historical SICCT test interval
were used to identify herds in LRAs in England (on
4 yearly testing throughout the period considered),
since the number of these herds has decreased over
time (online Supplementary Fig. S1).
Data on holdings, on historic bTB test results, on
incidence and on animal life histories are taken,
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respectively, from the Defra animal health informa-
tion system (SAM) provided by the Animal & Plant
Health Agency (APHA) and from the British Cattle
Movement System (BCMS) Cattle Tracing System
Database (CTS). Data extraction were done as
described in online Supplementary Section S2.1,
which resulted in analyses on 13 327 herds in LRA
and 10 145 herds in Scotland.
Statistical analysis
Multivariate logistic mixed models were formulated to
assess bTB candidate risk factors in herds in Scotland
and in England (with 4-year testing) during 2008 and
2013. Both year and county were included as random
effects and annual mean herd size, herd type (according
to online Supplementary Table S1), Irish imports and
high-risk movements were considered as ﬁxed effects
(see online Supplementary Section S2.2 for more
details). Models were evaluated using the AIC model
score according to online Supplementary Section
S2.3. Only the predictors that were signiﬁcant at P<
0·05 were included in the ﬁnal model. Interactions
and associations between variables were also explored.
The signiﬁcant ﬁxed effects are presented as odds ratios
(Odds) with 95% conﬁdence intervals. The ﬁtted values
extracted from the most signiﬁcant model correspond
to the probability of the herd becoming infected in
each year of the study (pintro).
The data were prepared using a combination of UNIX
bash scripting and AWK commands for data extraction,
and R [24] for data processing and management. The
multivariate logistic mixed models and the model selec-
tion were developed in the R lme4 [25, 26] and
LMERConvenienceFunctions [27] packages.
BTB surveillance framework
Source data
Using the same study period as above, per herd data
were extracted from the SAM and CTS databases
and derived from the risk factor analysis (Section
‘Underlying risk factors for bTB breakdowns’).
Batches of cattle in the previous year from holdings
to slaughterhouse were extracted from CTS.
Holdings that did not send any animals to the slaugh-
terhouse were not considered, resulting in a total of 12
942 herds from 13 327 low-risk English herds and
9776 herds from 10 145 Scottish herds used in the ana-
lysis in the section ‘Underlying risk factors for bTB
breakdowns’. The following variables were calculated
for each herd for every year between 2008 and 2013:
herd size, herd type, herd-level prevalence of infection,
number of batches from HRAs received in the previ-
ous year, number of Irish imports received in the
previous year and number of batches sent to slaugh-
terhouse in the previous year.
Surveillance scenarios
A number of baseline and risk-based surveillance
options were explored, considering both the likelihood
of becoming infected and detected by SICCT and at
the slaughterhouse. The baseline scenarios include
slaughterhouse surveillance without live testing of
herds, which represents a minimal model (the lowest
amount of surveillance that a herd could be under)
or, in addition, either 1-year (the maximal model
that corresponds to the most prevalent surveillance
approach in HRAs under the current testing regime),
2-year or 4-year RHT (the models that correspond to
RHT surveillance every 2 or 4 years, respectively).
The risk-based surveillance scenarios were modelled
considering the risk factors identiﬁed in the section
‘Underlying risk factors for bTB breakdowns’
together with the proportion of the herd’s total stock
that is sent annually to slaughter as elements of infec-
tion risk and detection. All modelled risk-based scen-
arios also include routine slaughter surveillance
(baseline). Table 2 provides a summary of the surveil-
lance components of each scenario. ‘Scenarios 1–4’
test more often herds that import ‘high-risk’ animals
and send a low proportion of the total herd to slaugh-
ter every year; ‘scenarios 5–6’ test more often herds
that import ‘high-risk’ animals, send a low proportion
of animals to slaughter, and that have a large number
of animals; ‘scenarios 7–8’ test more often herds that
only have a large number of animals, and, the
‘Scottish scenario’ represents the surveillance that
has been implemented in Scotland since 1 January
2012, in which herds that have a large number of ani-
mals, import ‘high-risk’ animals and send a low num-
ber of animals to slaughter are not exempt from
testing. A detailed description of the elements of risk
of infection, of the model assumptions and of the risk-
based scenarios point-score system can be found in
online Supplementary Section S3.
Model description
To evaluate the likelihood of herd-level freedom from
infection (herd probability of undetected infection)
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with bTB during a speciﬁed time period (t) the model
requires the following parameters:
(a) The probability of the herd becoming infected at
time t (p(intro)t) (from the section ‘Underlying
risk factors for bTB breakdowns’);
(b) Herd size at time t;
(c) The efﬁcacy of the surveillance system implemen-
ted on the farm (RHT and slaughterhouse testing)
(d) The herd-level prevalence of infection pstar.
The model only considers explicitly RHT and
slaughterhouse surveillance. The efﬁcacy of the sur-
veillance system is evaluated by calculating the
herd-level test system sensitivity sesystem, which
includes the RHT and part slaughterhouse testing:
sesystem = 1− (1− seherd)(1− se part),
in which seherd is the sensitivity of the SICCT imple-
mented as a herd test, and separt is the part herd sensi-
tivity for slaughterhouse surveillance. The herd
sensitivity for a whole herd test is calculated as
seherd = 1− (1− seSICCT )d ,
Where seSICCT is the animal-level sensitivity of the
screening test and d is the number of infected animals
in the herd deﬁned as:
d = N × pstar.
The value d is the product of a number drawn from
the distribution of pstar and the annual average num-
ber of animals in the herd N. The sensitivity for a
part herd test for the proportion of the herd that is
sent to slaughter is:
se part = 1− 1 n× seslhN
( )d
,
where n is the number of animals sent to slaughter per
annum.
The false positive (unconﬁrmed breakdown) detec-
tion rate of the whole herd test spherd is deﬁned as:
spherd = 1− spnanimal,
where spnanimal with n=N is the speciﬁcity for whole
herd tests.
In this analysis, the values used for the test sensitiv-
ities and speciﬁcities follow the meta-analysis of bTB
diagnostic test performance in Great Britain per-
formed by Downs et al. [28].
The probability of freedom (the posterior) at time t
is given by:
p( free)t =
1− priort
(1− priort) + priort × (1− sesystem)
,
where priort is the prior probability that the herd is
infected at time t. The prior for t+ 1 is:
priort+1 = (1− p( free)t) + p(intro)t
−(1− p( free)t)∗p(intro)t.
Model evaluation
The model was implemented in the R statistical envir-
onment and run for 100 simulations using data
between 2008 and 2013, with 2008 used as a ’burn-in’
period. The start of the routine herd testing cycle (e.g.
every 1-, 2-, 4-years) was generated randomly for each
simulation, to minimise cyclical effects. The risk-based
scenarios were evaluated from 2009 to 2013 by com-
paring the following variables to the equivalent
ﬁtted values from the current surveillance scenarios
in each area (LRA: 4 year-RHT, Scotland: Scottish
scenario; the national totals for each term are given
by summing the values for all herds). If the absolute
difference between two values is <5%, then these
values are considered similar. Derivation of each
term for each holding at a time t is described below:
(a) The annual expected number of latent infections.
Probability of being latently infected for each
farm at time t: (1− p(free)t).
(b) The total ﬁtted number of detected infections.
Probability of a detected infection at time: (priort-
− p(free)t).
(c) The annual number of herds tested.
(d) The annual number of cattle tested.
(e) The annual expected number of false positives.
The parameter spherd gives the probability of a
given herd being a false positive. Therefore, sum-
ming up spherd for all herds for a given year gives
the expected number of false positives.
A scenario is considered to have improved detection
if it has similar or higher number of detections and
lower number of latent infections.
Comparison of bTB risk between LRAs and Scotland
To compare the risk of bTB infection between LRAs
and Scotland, we have applied the predictor of the
best-ﬁtted statistical model in LRAs to Scottish herds,
and the predictor of the best-ﬁtted model in Scotland
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to the English herds (see the section ‘Underlying risk
factors for bTB breakdowns’). Should LRA herds
with the same predicted probabilities under the
Scottish model tend to have higher breakdown rates
(or vice versa) this would imply an inherently different
epidemiological risk between these areas, for example
different demographics of the respective cattle popula-
tions, presence of a wildlife reservoir or any other risk
factor not captured by these models.
RESULTS
Underlying risk factors for bTB breakdowns in LRAs
and Scotland
The models created for the risk-factor analysis have a
substantial predictive value, as indicated by the area
under the curve (LRA England, AUC= 0·8685;
Scotland, AUC= 0·8533; online Supplementary
Fig. S2). The signiﬁcance of the variables used to
determine the risk factors in LRAs and in Scotland
was estimated for the study period 2008–2013. Of
the variables considered in the analysis, herd size,
receiving batches from HRAs, and Irish imports
were associated with bTB incidents in both LRAs
and Scotland (Fig. 1, online Supplementary
Table S2). The larger the herd, the higher is the
association with bTB infection (Fig. 1 and online
Supplementary Fig. S3 and Table S2). This associ-
ation also applies across different herd types (online
Supplementary Fig. S4), with the exception of dairy
herds where there is a large overlap of the two
distributions, and of store herds (young beef or mixed-
breed animals reared and sold for ﬁnishing on fatten-
ing farms) in Scotland, which did not suffer any
breakdowns (online Supplementary Fig. S4-B).
Receiving batches from HRAs and/or importing
animals from Ireland in the previous year are also
associated with bTB incidents in both areas (Fig. 1,
online Supplementary Table S2). This outcome is con-
sistent with an independent analysis of movements as
risks (online Supplementary Section S1, Fig. S5).
BTB surveillance in LRAs and in Scotland
Probability of undetected infection
In general, the probability of undetected infection per
herd in LRAs is higher than in Scotland for all the pre-
sented scenarios (Fig. 2). While the probabilities under
different baseline scenarios are distinctly different, these
differences are substantially reduced for the risk-based
schemes, especially in Scotland where some of the
curves are overlapping. As expected, the high probabil-
ity with slaughterhouse surveillance alone (grey line,
Fig. 2a,c) decreases with increased RHT.
Finishing herds have a lower probability of
undetected infection (higher probability of freedom
from infection) in both LRAs and in Scotland (online
Supplementary Fig. S6). In LRAs, they are followed
by dairy, by both beef and suckler, and by store,
while for the period of the study, Scotland did not
register any breakdowns in store herds (online
Supplementary Fig. S4-B), making beef and suckler
(herd of cattle composed of dams and their young
calves up to the point of weaning) the riskiest herds,
followed by dairy. There is a linear relationship
between the average number of animals sent to
slaughter per year and the average herd size with dis-
tinct clustering of ﬁnishing and dairy herds both in
LRAs and in Scotland (online Supplementary
Fig. S7). In LRAs, ﬁnishing herds are typically smal-
ler than dairy herds (with the exception of some out-
liers), however, they have more per capita
movements to slaughter than dairy ones, followed by
store, beef and suckler (online Supplementary
Fig. S7-a). In Scotland, the trend is the same as in
LRAs, with the exception that suckler herds have
Fig. 1. The results of a mixed logistic regression model
that computes the herd risk of infection and determines
the risk factors associated with bovine Tuberculosis
breakdowns in low-risk areas in England (a) and in
Scotland (b) between 2008 and 2013. Odds ratios and 95%
conﬁdence intervals express the contribution of each one
of the signiﬁcant risk factors.
Risk-based strategies for surveillance of tuberculosis infection. 5
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268817001935
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Edinburgh College of Art, on 11 Dec 2017 at 15:29:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
more per capita movements to slaughter than beef and
dairy (online Supplementary Fig. S7-b).
When herd-level risk of infection is incorporated
into surveillance scenarios, the cumulative herd level
probabilities of harbouring undetected infection (calcu-
lated by the cumulative distribution function (CDF))
are very similar across the different risk-based scenarios
(Fig. 2), reﬂecting the importance of slaughterhouse
surveillance for many herds (the one factor that is con-
stant across scenarios). In LRAs, for higher values of
proportion of herds tested, scenario 1 is the one that
shows the lowest probability of undetected infection
per herd, followed by scenarios 7 and 8. In Scotland,
there are no major differences between the different
scenarios, with the exception of scenarios 5, 6 and
Scottish scenarios, which present slightly higher prob-
abilities of harbouring undetected infection per herd.
Surveillance scenarios ranking
The different surveillance scenarios were ranked
according to their levels of detection (numbers of
latent and detected infections), testing burden (num-
bers of animals and herds tested annually) and the
number of SICCT false positive herd results gener-
ated. The values of these variables were estimated
for each scenario for both areas, were compared
with the current surveillance regimes in each area
(LRAs, ‘4 year RHT’; Scotland, ‘Scottish scenario’)
and are presented in Figure 3 and in Table 1.
Baseline scenarios perform as expected, with the not-
able feature that increased frequency of RHTs
(Table 1) greatly reduce the number of latent infec-
tions with RHT frequency (4 and 15 compared with
32 in LRAs; 1 and 5 compared with 30 in Scotland),
but with a minimal increase in the number of detected
infections, while generating substantially more false
positives (2 and 4 times more than the current
systems).
Results of the risk-based surveillance model (all
ﬁgures per annum) are presented in Figure 3 and
Tables 1 and 2. These can be divided into three differ-
ent categories, all of which reduce the burden of
testing:
Fig. 2. The cumulative distribution plot of the probability of each herd harbouring undetected infection at the end of each
model time step for all eligible herds in LRA England (a) and in Scotland (b) between 2009 and 2013 from the four
baseline surveillance scenarios. Subplots C and D show the cumulative distribution plot of the probability of each herd
harbouring undetected infection at the end of each model time step for all eligible herds in LRA England (c) and in
Scotland (d) during 2009–2013 from nine risk-based surveillance scenarios. The axes were truncated for clarity.
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(1) Scenarios that improve detection
In LRAs, scenario 1 decreases latent infections
by 9% (29 compared with 32) for a similar level
of detected infections, it tests 5% fewer herds
annually (3065 compared with 3235), 6% fewer
animals (369 673 compared with 391 613), and
generates 6% fewer false positives (68 compared
with 72), when compared with the current
4-Year RHT regime. In Scotland, scenario 2
reduces latent infections by 7% (12 compared
with 14) for a similar number of detected cases
(within 5%), tests 26% fewer animals (304 968
compared with 306 499 for a slight higher number
of herds tested) and generates 10% fewer false
positives (45 compared with 41) than the current
surveillance regime (Scottish scenario).
(2) Scenarios that reproduce similar levels of detection.
For the same level of detection, scenario 2 offers
a saving of 22% on the number of herds tested
annually (2531 compared with 3235), 26% on the
number of animals tested (290 579 compared with
391 613), and 24% on the number of false positives
(56 compared with 72) in LRAs when compared
with the current 4-year RHT regime. In Scotland
scenario 6 reduces the herd testing by 17% (1328
compared with 1602), the animal testing by 20%
(244 088 compared with 306 499), and the number
of false positives by 24% (31 compared with 41)
when compared with the Scottish scenario.
(3) Scenarios that substantially reduce the burden of
testing but lower the levels of detection.
The scenario that offers savings on the burden
of testing but at the expense of reduced detection
of infected herds in LRAs is scenario 3. This scen-
ario would reduce the testing burden by testing
44% fewer animals (220 621 compared with 391
613), 36% fewer herds (2074 compared with
3235) and generate 38% fewer false positives
(45 compared with 72) while increasing the num-
ber of latent infections by 9% (35 compared with
Fig. 3. Risk-based surveillance scenarios comparison between LRA England and Scotland. Each panel represents the
surveillance variables used in the probability of freedom model and the x- and y-axes represent the rankings of each
scenario. Each colour represents the different scenarios and the triangle overlap represents that more than one scenario
had the same ranking related to the variable in study. The 4-year scenario was also included in the analysis for
comparison with the risk-based ones.
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32) for the same level of detection. This scenario
would also miss 3 out of 13 breakdowns identiﬁed
by RHT (Table 2).
The remaining scenarios would increase the burden
of testing with at best minimal detection beneﬁts, and
therefore would not contribute to an increased per-
formance of the surveillance system and are not con-
sidered further here.
Comparison of bTB risk between LRAs and Scotland
The herd probability of infection given by the English
and Scottish predictors is presented in Figure 4. The
estimated herd probability of bTB infection is lower
in Scotland than in LRAs (μ(Scot) = 0·00080,
σ2(Scot) = 2·5e-06; μ(LRA) = 0·0020, σ2(LRA) =
4·1e-05; online Supplementary Fig. S8) and if
Scottish herds were exposed to the same risk as
herds in LRAs the average risk per herd would
increase to 0·0013 (σ2 = 7·2 × 10−6, online Supplemen-
tary Fig. S9). However, if LRA English herds were
exposed to the same risk as herds in Scotland, the pre-
dicted risk of infection would be similar to Scotland
(μ= 0·00080, σ2 = 2·3 × 10−6) suggesting that there is
an inherent geographical difference between the two
areas, with the risk of bTB infection higher in LRAs.
DISCUSSION
The development of our proposed risk-based surveil-
lance strategy has two major aims. The ﬁrst is to iden-
tify inefﬁciencies: in the case of bTB, this amounts to
identifying where slaughterhouse surveillance works
well and therefore RHT can most safely be discarded.
The second is to identify those herds most likely to
present an infection risk: both those most likely to
become infected and (more difﬁcult to deﬁne) those
more likely to present risks to others. For bTB in
the absence of a wildlife reservoir, larger herds and
those that purchase cattle from HRAs are more likely
to become infected, while herds that sell on many cat-
tle to other premises, present the greatest infection
risk. As our statistical models do not capture this
onward transmission related risks, and as some of
these risks are captured indirectly by herd characteris-
tics, intelligent decision-making is sometimes required
to balance off these issues. For example, ﬁnishing
herds bring in many cattle and therefore are a high
risk of becoming infected, however they also send
many cattle to slaughter and do not sell on many cat-
tle to other premises, and therefore present a low risk
to others.
Despite some broad similarities (the same risk fac-
tors and some similarities in the cattle industry),
Table 1. Summary of the bovine TB surveillance analysis results for low-risk areas in England and for Scotland
between 2009 and 2013
Surveillance
scenario
Interval
(years)
Herds tested Animals tested
Detected
infections
Latent
infections False positives
LRA Scotland LRA Scotland LRA Scotland LRA Scotland LRA Scotland
Baseline scenarios
Slaughterhouse n.a. 0 0 0 0 120 33 80 30 0 0
4 Year 4 3235 2444 391 613 412 293 144 45 32 12 72 58
2 Year 2 6471 4888 783 226 824 587 142 46 15 5 143 115
1 Year 1 12 942 9776 1 566 452 1 649 175 136 45 4 1 286 231
Risk-based surveillance
Scenario 1 0/2/4 3065 2090 369 673 349 453 147 45 29 11 68 49
Scenario 2 0/4 2531 1930 290 579 304 968 143 45 33 12 56 45
Scenario 3 0/4 2074 1629 220 621 227 379 142 44 35 13 45 37
Scenario 4 0/1/2/4 2827 2262 448 135 454 829 143 46 33 11 68 57
Scenario 5 0/1/2/4 1803 1483 264 090 308 083 139 43 39 14 41 36
Scenario 6 0/1/2/4 1682 1328 213 163 244 088 138 42 40 14 37 31
Scenario 7 1/4 3878 3428 735 237 1 352 799 145 46 30 3 270 207
Scenario 8 1/4 3486 2871 570 664 736 476 144 45 31 11 80 72
Scottish scenario 0/4 2166 1602 292 074 306 499 139 43 37 14 51 41
The ‘4 year’ baseline scenario is the one currently implemented in LRAs and the ‘current’ risk-based scenario is the one that
has been implemented in Scotland since January 2012.
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Table 2. Composition of the risk based surveillance scenarios for low-risk areas in England and Scotland during 2009–2013
Criteria Points Testing interval
No. herds (%) bTB cases RHT
LRA Scotland LRA Scotland LRA Scotland
Scenario 1
Slaughtering <25% of stock +1 0 points = no testing 2632 (20·3) 2015 (20·6) 93 18 2 2
Receiving ‘high-risk’ animals in >3 years and slaughtering
<50% of stock
+1 1 point = 4 year testing 8359 (64·6) 7159 (73·2) 34 22 10 9
2 points = 2 year testing 1951 (15·1) 602 (6·2) 19 5 6 2
Scenario 2
Slaughtering <25% of stock and/or receiving ‘high-risk ’
animals in >3 years and slaughtering <40% of stock
1 0 points = no testing 2815 (21·8) 2053 (21) 94 19 2 2
1 point = 4 year testing 10 127 (78·2) 7723 (79) 52 26 16 11
Scenario 3
Slaughtering <12·5% of stock and/or receiving ’high-risk’
animals in >3 years and slaughtering <25% of stock
1 0 points = no testing 4643 (35·9) 3259 (33·3) 106 26 4 3
1 point = 4 year testing 8299 (64·1) 6517 (66·7) 40 19 14 10
Scenario 4
Slaughtering >25% of stock −1 −1 or 0 points = no testing 4524 (35) 3152 (35) 27 12 4 3
Slaughtering <5% of stock +1 1 point = 4 year testing 6166 (47·6) 4585 (46·9) 101 22 8 4
Receiving ’high risk’ animals in >3 years +1 2 points = 2 year testing 1932 (14·9) 1845 (18·9) 14 10 6 4
Having >100 animals +1 3 points = 1 year testing 320 (2·5) 194 (2) 4 1 0 2
Scenario 5
Slaughtering >25% of stock −1 −1 or 0 points = no testing 6828 (52·8) 4504 (46·1) 72 25 8 4
Slaughtering <5% of stock +1 1 point = 4 year testing 5076 (39·2) 4679 (47·9) 67 15 9 6
Receiving ’high risk’ animals in >3 years +1 2 points = 2 year testing 1007 (7·8) 559 (5·7) 7 5 1 3
Having >350 animals +1 3 points = 1 year testing 31 (0·2) 34 (0·3) 0 0 0 0
Scenario 6
Slaughtering >25% of stock −1 −1 or 0 points = no testing 7160 (55·3) 4878 (49·9) 89 31 11 6
Slaughtering <5% of stock +1 1 point = 4 year testing 4859 (37·5) 4499 (46) 50 10 6 5
Receiving ’high risk’ animals in >3 years +1 2 points = 2 year testing 910 (7) 390 (4) 7 4 1 2
Having >500 animals +1 3 points = 1 year testing 13 (0·1) 9 (0·1) 0 0 0 0
Scenario 7
Having4350 animals 1 1 point = 4 year testing 857 (6·6) 1312 (13·4) 58 14 3 4
Having >350 3 3 points = 1 year testing 12 085 (93·4) 8464 (86·6) 88 31 15 9
Scenario 8
Having4500 animals 1 1 point = 4 year testing 12 607 (97·4) 9206 (94·2) 110 37 17 11
Having >500 3 3 points = 1 year testing 335 (2·6) 570 (5·8) 36 8 1 2
Scottish scenario
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risks compared across LRAs and Scotland have some
subtle differences, notably the mean risk of infection
of bTB per herd (LRAs have higher probability of
risk of infection per herd than Scotland), and differ-
ences in per capita movements to slaughter (in
LRAs, beef herds have more per capita movements
to slaughter than suckler and dairy herds, while in
Scotland suckler herds have more per capita move-
ments to slaughter than beef and dairy). Store herds
have the lowest probability of freedom from infection
with slaughterhouse surveillance only, while in
Scotland they are the least risky after ﬁnishing herds.
England and Scotland have proceeded along differ-
ent surveillance paths until now, mainly as a result of
differences in the underlying legislative and policy
environments. As the EU granted ofﬁcial bTB free
(OTF) status to Scotland in September 2009, this
offered the opportunity to do away with routine test-
ing of low-risk herds (while maintaining very similar
detection rates), and so a risk-based surveillance strat-
egy based on our previous work [23] was adopted. The
evidence presented here suggests some reﬁnements
that could offer a higher reduction on the testing bur-
den while maintaining the current level of bTB detec-
tion in Scotland (scenarios 2 and 6). By contrast, in
the LRA of England the process to secure OTF status
has already begun, but has not yet been achieved.
Therefore, any reduction of testing at this stage
would present a greater risk and could jeopardise
this process. However, it is something that policy-
makers should consider if the LRA is recognised as
OTF in due course. On the other hand, the present
study shows that there is little to be gained from
increased routine herd testing frequencies in the
LRA. Whether or not changes in surveillance in
LRAs are currently merited, nonetheless it is import-
ant to understand the extent to which the areas consid-
ered low risk in England may differ from Scotland, as
this may be an indicator of the feasibility of achieve-
ment of OTF status in LRAs.
A good prediction of the risk of infection in both
LRAs and in Scotland is determined by the size of the
herd, by movements from HRAs, and by whether
herds receive animals from Ireland. Larger herds have
a greater likelihood of infection in both areas, conﬁ-
rming previous results in an earlier time period [4, 29].
The continued signiﬁcance of the high-risk movements
despite pre-movement testing suggests that greater test
sensitivity could accrue substantial beneﬁts (possibly
even if there is a cost of reduced test speciﬁcity). The
risk of bTB breakdowns can also be due to local effectsT
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such as the history of bTB cases in the herd [4, 19] and
poor farm biosecurity [30]. These factors have not been
considered in the analysis, but it is likely that they also
play a role and be responsible for the persistence and
spread of the disease. That herds in LRAs have substan-
tially higher risk of infection than in Scotland even
under the same risk model is notable, suggesting that
there are important epidemiological factors not captured
in our models; this merits further study beyond the
scope of this paper.
In this work, a model of freedom from infection
was used to evaluate different strategies for surveil-
lance for bTB in LRAs and Scotland. By exploiting
statistical analyses deﬁning herd level probability of
freedom from disease layered by signiﬁcant risk
factors, testing frequencies can be reﬁned to test highly
probable infections more frequently, and conversely
potentially reducing testing of low-risk herds. The
strategies modelled here focused on signiﬁcant indica-
tors of risk, penalizing herds with large sizes that
receive ‘risky’ imports (movements from HRAs and
Ireland). Herds that send a small proportion of their
stock to slaughterhouse are also penalised, as this
makes slaughterhouse detection less likely.
While the actual policy implemented will depend on
other considerations such as the practicality of
implementation and the differential impact on the
various sectors of the industry, our analyses show
that the current schemes in LRAs and in Scotland
are effective and a more frequent testing regime (1
or 2 years interval) will provide higher freedom from
disease (originate fewer latent infections), but will
not improve the current number of detected break-
downs and will substantially increase the burden asso-
ciated with testing. However, surveillance in LRAs
can be improved if herds that are at higher risk are tar-
geted. It is not expected that these factors affect the
performance of the model, however. As the frame-
work used is scalable and adaptable, it can be
extended with other surveillance scenarios, as well as
other policy measures currently implemented in both
LRAs and Scotland, such as pre-movement and post-
movement testing.
CONCLUSION
This paper has demonstrated that the determinants of
bTB infections in LRAs of England and in Scotland
are very similar to each other, but that the magnitude
of risk in LRAs is markedly higher than in Scotland,
suggesting some underlying risks not captured in this
analysis. Risk-based surveillance is an effective and
efﬁcient method that reduces the cost by testing
fewer animals whilst improving/maintaining the level
of disease detection. A full evaluation of the best strat-
egy would entail a cost-beneﬁt analysis considering
the impacts of all changes in testing rates, impact on
herd restrictions, and risk of onward transmission,
and more subtly, changes in surveillance that may
have unintended consequences for farmer behaviour.
While such analyses lie outside the scope of this
paper, the results presented here, specifying the purely
epidemiological beneﬁts of risk-based surveillance, are
the essential groundwork for such a broader task.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
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found at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268817001935
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks to A.P. Mitchell for data access and help in
the interpretation of the databases, and P. Upton for
help in generating herd sizes from the CTS database.
Thanks to members of the bTB Programme of
Defra and project report anonymous reviewers for
Fig. 4. Herd probability of infection given by the English
(LRA) and Scottish predictors. The different colours
represent the location of each herd (orange: LRA England,
light blue: Scotland). If herds in Scotland were exposed to
the same level of risk as herds in LRA England, their
probability of getting infected would be higher. From the
other hand, if herds in LRA England were exposed to the
same level of risk as herds in Scotland, their probability of
getting infected would be lower.
Risk-based strategies for surveillance of tuberculosis infection. 11
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268817001935
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Edinburgh College of Art, on 11 Dec 2017 at 15:29:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
comments on an earlier version of this work. Thanks
to Theo Pepler for comments on an earlier presenta-
tion of this work. Thanks to Ricardo De la
Rua-Domenech for useful feedback on the ﬁnal ver-
sion of this work. LCMS and MD were funded by
Defra project SE3285, JE by Scottish Government
as part of EPIC: Scotland’s Centre of Expertise on
Animal Disease Outbreaks.
DECLARATION OF INTEREST
The authors have no conﬂicts of interest.
REFERENCES
1. Bourne F. Bovine TB: The Scientiﬁc Evidence. A Science
Base for A Sustainable Policy to Control TB in Cattle.
Final report of the Independent Scientiﬁc Group on
Cattle TB. London: Department for Environment
Food & Rural Affairs (Defra), 2007.
2. Donnelly CA, et al. Impacts of widespread badger cul-
ling on cattle tuberculosis: concluding analyses from a
large-scale ﬁeld trial. International Journal of
Infectious Diseases 2007; 11(4): 300–308.
3. Johnston WT, et al. Herd-level risk factors associated
with tuberculosis breakdowns among cattle herds in
England before the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease epi-
demic. Biology Letters 2005; 1(1): 53–56.
4. Bessell PR, et al. Risk factors for bovine tuberculosis at
the national level in Great Britain. BMC Veterinary
Research 2012; 8(1): 51.
5. White PCL, et al. Control of bovine tuberculosis in
British livestock: there is no ‘silver bullet’. Trends in
Microbiology 2008; 16(9): 420–427.
6. Krebs JR. Bovine tuberculosis in cattle and badgers.
State Veterinary Journal (UK) 1998; 8(1): 1–3.
7. Baker C. Bovine TB statistics: Great Britain. House of
Commons Library 2015; 6081: 1–9.
8. Vial F, Johnston WT, Donnelly CA. Local cattle and
badger populations affect the risk of conﬁrmed tubercu-
losis in British cattle herds. PLoS ONE 2011; 6(3):
e18058.
9. Karolemeas K, et al. Predicting prolonged bovine tuber-
culosis breakdowns in Great Britain as an aid to control.
Preventive Veterinary Medicine 2010; 97(3–4): 183–190.
10. Olea-Popelka F, et al. A case study of bovine tubercu-
losis in an area of County Donegal, Ireland. Ireland
Veterinary Journal 2006; 59(12): 683–690.
11. King D. Bovine Tuberculosis in Cattle and Badgers.
London: Department for Environment Food & Rural
Affairs (Defra), 2007.
12. Carrique-Mas JJ, Medley GF, Green LE. Risks for
bovine tuberculosis in British cattle farms restocked
after the foot and mouth disease epidemic of 2001.
Preventive Veterinary Medicine 2008; 84(1): 85–93.
13. Ramírez-Villaescusa AM, et al. Risk factors for herd
breakdown with bovine tuberculosis in 148 cattle
herds in the south west of England. Preventive
Veterinary Medicine 2010; 95(3–4): 224–230.
14. Woodroffe R, et al. Effects of culling on badger abun-
dance: implications for tuberculosis control. Journal of
Zoology 2007; 274(1): 28–37.
15. Donnelly CA, et al. Positive and negative effects of wide-
spread badger culling on tuberculosis in cattle. Nature
2006; 439(7078): 843–846.
16. Hone J, Donnelly CA. Evaluating evidence of associ-
ation of bovine tuberculosis in cattle and badgers.
Journal of Applied Ecology 2008; 45(6): 1660–1666.
17. DEFRA-Publications. The Strategy for Achieving
Ofﬁcially Bovine Tuberculosis Free Status for England.
London: Defra-Publications, 2014.
18. Gopal R, Goodchild A, et al. Introduction of bovine
tuberculosis to north-east England by bought-in cattle.
Veterinary Record 2006; 159(9): 265–271.
19. Green DM, et al. Estimates for local and movement-
based transmission of bovine tuberculosis in British cat-
tle. Proceedings of the Royal Society London B:
Biological Sciences 2008; 275(1638): 1001–1005.
20. White P, et al. Predictors of the ﬁrst between-herd ani-
mal movement for cattle born in 2002 in Ireland.
Preventive Veterinary Medicine 2010; 97(3–4): 264–269.
21. Schiller I, et al. Bovine tuberculosis: effect of the tuberculin
skin test on in vitro interferon gamma responses. Veterinary
Immunology and Immunopathology 2010; 136(1): 1–11.
22. Rothel JS, et al. The gamma-interferon assay for diagno-
sis of bovine tuberculosis in cattle: conditions affecting
the production of gamma-interferon in whole blood cul-
ture. Australian Veterinary Journal 1992; 69(1): 1–4.
23. Bessell PR, et al. Developing a framework for risk-
based surveillance of tuberculosis in cattle: a case
study of its application in Scotland. Epidemiology and
Infection 2012; 141(2): 314–323.
24. R Core Team. R: A Language and Environment for
Statistical Computing. Vienna, Austria: R Foundation
for Statistical Computing, 2014 (http://www.r-project.
org/). Accessed 29 June 2016.
25. Bates D, et al. Lme4: linear mixed-effects models using
Eigen and S4. R Package Version 1 2014; 1(7): 1–23.
26. Bates D, et al. Fitting linear mixed-effects models using
lme4. Journal of Statistical Software 2015; 67(1): 1–48.
27. Tremblay A, Ransijn J. LMERConvenienceFunctions:
Model Selection and Post-hoc Analysis for (G)LMER
Models. R package version 2.10 (https://CRAN.R-pro-
ject.org/package=LMERConvenienceFunctions), 2015.
28. Downs S, et al.Meta-analysis of diagnostic test perform-
ance and modelling of testing strategies for control of
bovine tuberculosis. In Proceedings of the Society for
Veterinary Epidemiology and Preventive Medicine,
2011, pp. 139–153.
29. Vial F, Donnelly CA. Localized reactive badger culling
increases risk of bovine tuberculosis in nearby cattle
herds. Biology Letters 2011; rsbl201105. doi: 10.1098/
rsbl.2011.0554.
30. Ortiz-Pelaez A, Pfeiffer DU. Use of data mining techni-
ques to investigate disease risk classiﬁcation as a proxy
for compromised biosecurity of cattle herds in Wales.
BMC Veterinary Research 2008; 4(1): 24.
12 L. C. M. Salvador and others
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268817001935
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Edinburgh College of Art, on 11 Dec 2017 at 15:29:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
